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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT 
OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                    
NO. 06-3394
                    
 JOHN HOWARD BUGGS, JR.
Appellant
v.
FRANKLIN J. TENNIS; THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
OF THE COUNTY OF PHILADELPHIA;
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF PENNSYLVANIA
                    
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 05-cv-04865)
District Judge:  Hon. Edmund V. Ludwig
                   
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 31, 2008
BEFORE:  SLOVITER, STAPLETON, and TASHIMA,*
Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: November 4, 2008)
                    
                                        
*Hon. A. Wallace Tashima, Senior United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth
Circuit, sitting by designation.
2                    
OPINION OF THE COURT
                    
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:
John Buggs filed a petition for habeas corpus relief claiming that his attorney’s
failure to solicit testimony from his friends and close family about the victim’s purported
reputation for dishonesty rendered the attorney’s assistance ineffective and thus denied
him a fair trial.  The District Court denied his petition; we will affirm.  
I.  
Because we write only for the parties who are familiar with the factual context and
procedural history of the case, we set forth only those facts necessary to our analysis.
Buggs was convicted of raping his cousin on three separate occasions, first when
she was nine years old, then when she was twelve, and finally when she was seventeen. 
After this final incident, she confided in a friend who urged her to go to the police; this
report ultimately led to Buggs’s arrest and indictment.  Buggs opted for a bench trial
where he testified that he had not had sexual contact with the victim until she was
seventeen, and only consensual contact thereafter.  He was convicted on all three counts
of rape.  
II.     
The gravamen of Buggs’s ineffective assistance claim is that his attorney failed to
     We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Because the District Court did1
not conduct an evidentiary hearing, we review its findings of fact and conclusions of law
without deference.  Slutzker v. Johnson, 393 F.3d 373, 378 (3d Cir. 2004).
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call and/or question some of his close friends and family members, who were apparently
prepared to testify that the victim had a reputation for dishonesty.   Reviewing this claim,1
Pennsylvania’s PCRA court considered the potential prejudice that this omission visited,
which it concluded was none, and refused to set aside his conviction.  Under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, we will not grant habeas relief unless this
decision ignored or misapprehended Supreme Court precedent on point, arrived at a
conclusion contrary to that precedent when “confront[ing] a set of facts that are materially
indistinguishable” from it, or involved an “unreasonable application of . . . clearly
established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406 (2000).  Because Buggs cites no case where the
Supreme Court granted relief on a materially indistinguishable set of facts, nor any
precedent that he believes was misapprehended or ignored, he is left to argue that the state
courts applied the existing precedent governing ineffective assistance claims – precedent
that demands Buggs show that 1) his counsel’s performance fell below an “objective
standard of reasonableness,” and 2) prejudice – in an unreasonable way.  See, e.g.,
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
As noted above, the PCRA court’s opinion was confined to the prejudice prong.  It 
concluded that it was highly unlikely that soliciting testimony from witnesses who were
     The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied discretionary review.2
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clearly not impartial about the victim’s purported reputation for dishonesty would have
changed the outcome.  This is especially so because Buggs’s attorney attacked the
victim’s credibility in other ways, exposing inconsistencies in her account, pointing out
her delay in coming forward, and by putting Buggs on the stand so that he could testify
that the victim was lying about the dimensions of their relationship.  As a result, the
PCRA court concluded that there is no “reasonable probability that, but for [this
omission], the result of the proceeding would have been different,” and this conclusion
was affirmed by the Superior Court.   We cannot say that this result constituted an2
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
III.
The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.
